The study develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the allocation of conservation funds via selectively o ering incentive payments to farmers for enrolling in one of two mutually exclusive agricultural conservation programs: retiring land from production or changing farming practices on land that remains in production. We investigate how the existence of a pre-xed budget allocation between the programs a ects the amounts of environmental bene ts obtainable under alternative policy implementation schemes.
Introduction
Managing agricultural land for the production of conservation services in addition to agricultural commodities has had a long tradition in the United
States. E orts to control soil erosion date back to the dust bowl days of the 1930s when cost share programs were used to pay part of the costs of structures that reduce erosion. More recently, wildlife habitat, open space, and carbon sequestration have been identi ed as important environmental bene ts attributed to agricultural conservation e orts, and, since the mid1980s, the focus has changed from cost share programs that a ect how land is worked to compensation for completely retiring land from production.
This switch in focus is clearly re ected in conservation spending. In the last two decades, public funding of agri-environmental programs has nearly tripled, with programs that retire environmentally sensitive land from crop production accounting for more than 85 percent of Federal conservation expenditures (Claassen, 2003) . The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest land retirement program with an annual budget about $1.6 billion, currently enrolls about 10 percent of the country's cropland.
In what may signal a major shift back towards working land management programs, the 2002 farm bill reverses the trend towards land retirement funding with a much larger increase for conservation programs on working land ($11 billion over 10 years) than for land retirement programs ($3 billion for the CRP and the Wetlands Reserve Program). In addition, the legislation initiated a new working land program | the Conservation Security Program (CSP). The CSP represents a fundamental change from previous working 1 land programs in that it goes beyond the notion of cost sharing for structural improvements to fully compensating farmers for the opportunity cost of changing practices (Claassen et al., 2001) . Thus, the CSP can be interpreted as a true \green" subsidy program. While details concerning implementation of the program are still in progress at this writing (USDA-NRCS, 2004a ), it appears that farmers will be o ered a set of payment options for the adoption of various conservation practices such as reduced tillage, improved nutrient management, and establishment of bu er strips.
There are a number of in uences prompting this refocusing of conservation e orts on working lands. First, working land accounts for the vast majority of agricultural land; environmental advocates have come to appreciate that if signi cant environmental bene ts are going to accrue from the agricultural sector, they will have to occur in conjunction with active production. Second, international pressure to separate farm support payments from production levels has generated an active interest in rede ning farm support payments in terms of green subsidies that would t under the \green box" of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement (Claassen et al., 2001 ). Third, while land retirement programs have produced a signi cant amount of environmental bene ts, they have done so at a fairly high cost; changing practices on working land may be a more cost-e ective approach.
This latter point provides the primary motivation for the present research. Compared to land retirement, the adoption of conservation practices on working land may seem to be more cost-e ective, as the opportunity cost of conservation on working land is lower given that it continues to provide agricultural products. However, the bene ts of conservation practices on working land are also likely to be smaller. For example, in general, conservation tillage on cropped land would not reduce nutrient runo as much as retiring the land completely from production. Thus, whether conservation practices on cropped land will be more cost-e ective than land retirement is an empirical question that may depend on both the speci c conservation practices adopted as well as the characteristics of the land. In addition, the e ciency of a working land program will also depend upon the details of how it is implemented (which practices are included, whether environmentally sensitive land is targeted, whether existing adopters of conservation practices are eligible, etc.) and how it is implemented vis a vis other conservation programs, such as the CRP.
In this study, we investigate the e ciency of working land conservation programs relative to land retirement programs. We begin by providing a theoretical framework for analyzing the trade-o s of conservation through working land and through land retirement. Given a policy objective of maximizing environmental bene t for a given conservation budget, we derive the optimal split of spending on conservation of working land vs. retiring land from production. Then, we examine the combined implementation of the programs when the share of funding is pre-xed, as in the 2002 Farm Bill. Following the theoretical framework, we develop empirical economic models of conservation practice adoption and land retirement and integrate them with a biophysical environmental model to conduct regional policy simulations based on eld-scale data. We study a variety of di erent ways in which the two types of conservation programs could be jointly implemented including simultaneous vs. sequential implementation of the programs with a pre-xed budget allocation.
In our empirical application, we initially focus on the environmental bene t of carbon sequestration. We also present results for soil erosion, but motivate and discuss our model throughout in terms of carbon. While soil erosion has long been a major concern in agriculture, the focus on carbon is motivated by the substantial interest that agricultural sequestration has generated recently (Pautsch et al.; Antle and McCarl; Antle et al., Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 2003b; Lewandrowski et al.; Choi and Sohngen) including its o cial place in trading on the Chicago Climate Exchange and the continued call for consideration of cost-e ective means for reducing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Further, carbon sequestration has already been identi ed as one of the important bene ts to be targeted by working land programs (USDA-NRCS, 2004b). Given our interest in carbon sequestration and soil erosion, it is natural to choose conservation tillage as the working land practice to study because of its well-known e ects on these two environmental indicators (see, e.g., Lewandrowski et al.) . 1
Our research builds on previous work related to the sequestration of carbon in agricultural soils and land retirement. The focus of existing carbon sequestration literature, including the examples previously mentioned, has primarily been the estimation of carbon sequestration potential and its cost or the implementation of carbon sequestration programs. A number of 1 While conservation tillage is included in major working land programs (such as the CSP and Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]), we do not attempt to model these programs exactly, but more generally focus on the trade-o s between conservation bene ts from placing a parcel in conservation tillage versus retiring the land from production.
4 studies have also investigated the environmental bene ts and e ciency characteristics of land retirement programs (Reichelderfer and Boggess; Smith; Babcock et al. 1996 Babcock et al. , 1997 Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen; Wu; Khanna et al.) . Despite the sizable literature on agricultural conservation programs, no study to our knowledge has investigated the quantitative trade-o s between conservation through land retirement and conservation on working land.
Neither has any research studied the e ciency implications of how these two programs are implemented and thereby compete for the enrollment of land parcels.
Theoretical framework
Suppose there are N parcels of land which are currently cropped. The size of parcel i is denoted as x i . Within each parcel, land is assumed to be homogeneous. The government provides incentives to farmers to promote conservation practices a i on the parcels. There are two methods of conservation for each parcel: retiring land from production (LR) or adopting some conservation practice on working land (WL), such as conservation tillage. Thus, we assume a i = wl, or a i = lr:
With the adoption of a i ; environmental performance on parcel i will be improved. The amount of improvement, which we refer to as environmental bene t of a i ; is denoted as q For a given conservation budget, B; suppose the policy objective of an incentive program is to maximize environmental bene ts. In deciding the best use of the conservation budget, it is convenient to consider two decisions to be made for each parcel: (1) the best practice for the parcel (a i ); and (2) given the chosen practice, a i , how much of the parcel (x i ) to enroll.
Depending on how the budget B is divided between the two programs, we consider two cases. In Case A, the share of funding between WL and LR is optimized. In Case B, the share of funding is xed, presumably by some political process. We rst discuss Case A.
Case A: Optimal share of funding
In this case, the share of funding between WL and LR is endogenously determined. In other words, policymakers are free to enroll parcels to maximize environmental bene ts with the only constraint being that they do not exceed the total conservation budget. Thus, the share of funding for each program is the outcome of the combined enrollment policy.
The rst step is to choose the practice on each parcel. In this case, the practice chosen for a parcel i is based on the following rule: if
; then a i = lr; otherwise,â i = wl: In other words, for each parcel i; the practice resulting in a higher marginal bene t per dollar is chosen. Given this practice choice, the second decision is how much of the parcel to enroll into the program. 2 Mathematically, for given a i ; the policymakers' problem is
Here x i is the acreage from parcel i enrolled in a conservation program
Using as the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint (1b), then, the optimalx i ; for given a i ; is determined by the following conditions (throughout the paper, the superscript \^" indicates the optimal solutions):
Intuitively,
is the (marginal) bene t per dollar from parcel i when conservation practice a i is chosen and^ is the marginal cost of the program due to limited funding. Thus, according to (2), given a i ; a parcel will be chosen as long as its marginal bene t is greater than the marginal cost.
Heuristically, Case A can be implemented as follows: for each parcel i; choose the maximum potential environmental bene t per dollar which is this strategy will not yield the least-cost allocation, as full optimization could require the re-allocation of previously assigned parcels between WL and LR as the budget changes.
However, such a program would be di cult or impossible to implement in practice. Further, this additional complexity is unnecessary given our focus on comparison of WL and LR under xed budgets. The value of the bene t per dollar of the last parcel chosen, corresponding to the lowest point on the red (bold) highlighted parts of the curves (e.g., By adding up the spending on all selected parcels for practice a i , we obtain the optimal funding for practice a i , denoted asB a i : That is, At rst blush, implementation of the land retirement and working land conservation programs as speci ed in the 2002 farm bill appear most analogous to Case B(i) since they have separate funding and agricultural land can be enrolled in either of the programs. However, given that the CRP started enrolling land in the middle 1980s when there were few incentive payments for working land, Case B(ii) may be a more apt comparison. Thus, we think both cases are interesting.
Case B(i): Simultaneous implementation of programs
This case is the same as problem (1) except that there are separate budget constraints for the LR and the WL programs, for any given a i :
Using lr and wl as the Lagrangian multipliers of (4b) and (4c), respectively, we have if p
Conditions in (5) are the same as those in (2), except that in the former the Lagrangian multipliers are for a given a i because of the separate budget constraint for each a i . As in Case A, for a given a i ; if the marginal bene t
) is greater than the marginal cost (^ a i ), then the parcel will be enrolled in the program for a i . When there is funding left for both practices, the practice with higher q p is selected for the parcel. However, once the funding allocated for one practice is exhausted, then there is only one choice of practice for all remaining parcels. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the choice of parcels, when parcels are rst selected for LR. Again, the optimal choices are the bold (red highlighted) portions of the curves. In both gures, given that some parcels (for example, parcels from N (n1) to N (n2) ) are rst selected into LR, they are no longer available for WL. As a result, given two parcels j and k; with ; parcel k may be chosen for WL, while parcel j is chosen for LR.
For example, in Figure 5 , comparing parcels ranked immediately after N (n1)
and parcels ranked immediately after N (n2) , the former has higher bene ts per dollar under WL than the latter under WL. Moreover, the former also provides a higher bene t per dollar under WL than under LR. However, the former is not chosen for WL, while the latter is.
Ine ciency of xed share budget allocations
There are two types of ine ciency arising from the xed-share of funding between the programs: the sub-optimal choice of parcels and the sub-optimal choice of practices. In Case B(i), consider as an example the case where 
While both cases of B may result in an e ciency loss relative to Case A, it is not clear a priori which of the two is more ine cient because both are second-best programs. However, Case B(ii) is less e cient than B(i) in the following sense: in Case B(i), for a given practice, a parcel with higher q a p a will be chosen before a parcel with lower q a p a ; unless, for a 0 6 = a; the former is chosen for a 0 : However, this is not necessarily the case for Case B(ii). One nal point of comparison can also be made between B(i) and B(ii): if the optimal budget shares are chosen, then simultaneous implementation of the programs (B(i)) will yield the optimal allocation. This is not the case for the sequential implementation (B(ii)). However, this does not necessarily mean 14 that sequential implementation is inferior to simultaneous implementation when the budget share is not optimal.
When the prices of WL and LR are the same and equal to one and all the parcels are of the same size, the area under each curve represents the total bene t potential from the corresponding practice. 3 Again, we use Figures 4 and 6 as examples. In both cases, the lost bene t from omitted parcels and the use of the wrong practice on the selected parcels are shaded with a \-" sign and the bene t from inappropriately included parcels are shaded with a \+" sign. Thus the net loss in bene t is the di erence between the two shaded areas. As previously discussed, whether Case B(i) or B(ii) will have larger loss of bene ts is an empirical question: depending on the distribution of parcels in terms of bene t per dollar under each practice, the di erence of the shaded areas in Figure 4 may be larger or smaller than that in Figure   6 .
Study region, data, and empirical models
The empirical analysis is conducted for the state of Iowa, which had over 1.9 million acres enrolled in land retirement programs (primarily the CRP) in 2003 and the largest number of such contracts among all 50 states. Iowa also ranks rst in total contract value; more than 11 percent of the national CRP rental payments go to acreage in the state totaling some $192 million in 2003 (USDA-FSA).
As noted in the introduction, we focus our empirical application primar-ily on carbon sequestration bene ts of conservation programs because of the substantial interest drawn recently to carbon sequestration in agricultural soils both in the policy arena and in science and economics research. We also estimate soil erosion bene ts because soil erosion has been a major environmental concern in agriculture for a long time. Iowa soils have been identi ed as a large potential source of carbon sequestration (Lal; Brenner et al.; Paustian et al.) and the state is part of the region where soil erosion is particularly high (CENR).
In modeling the conservation practice of land retirement, we assume establishment of grass cover on the land taken out of production. While other resource-conserving land covers are also possible, the grass covers have been by far the most commonly used on the land retired through CRP (see, e.g., USDA-FSA). Of the working land practices, we chose that of conservation tillage, the practice eligible for most of working land conservation programs.
Furthermore, conservation tillage is a natural choice for our empirical analysis as it is known to provide signi cant soil erosion bene ts and has the highest potential for storing carbon in the soils among all working land conservation practices (Lewandrowski et al.) .
The primary data source used in the analysis is the latest available National Resource Inventory (NRI) (USDA- NRCS, 1997) . The NRI provides information on the natural resource characteristics of the land, cropping history, and farming practices used by producers on some 13,225 physical points in the study area. Since the data are statistically reliable for state and multi-county analysis of non-federal land (Nusser and Goebel), they are representative of the agricultural land in Iowa. The major unit of our anal-ysis is an NRI point, which is treated as a producer with a farm size equal to the number of acres represented by the point, on average approximately 1,100 acres.
Empirical models of economic costs
To estimate the costs of adopting conservation tillage for every NRI point in the analysis, p wl i , i =1,. . . , 13225, we draw on the work of Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2003a) , which provides empirical estimates of a reduced form, discrete-choice adoption model for conservation tillage in Iowa. The underlying economic model begins with the standard assumption that a farmer will adopt conservation tillage when net returns from the practice exceed the returns from the alternative, conventional tillage practice, adjusting for di erences in risk. Speci cally, a farmer will choose conservation tillage when 1 > 0 + P , where 1 is the net returns to farming using conservation tillage, 0 is the net returns to conventional tillage, and P is a risk premium needed for adoption of conservation tillage, a practice that is generally believed to exhibit greater yield variability than conventional tillage methods.
Under the assumptions of a linear conservation tillage net returns function, 1 = x, a premium function P (z), a standard econometric error " with a variance multiplier , and observable net returns to conventional tillage 0 , the probability of adoption is estimated using standard discrete choice econometric methods on a sub-sample of 1992 NRI for Iowa as
where is a vector of parameters and x and z are explanatory variables.
Details on the variables, de nitions of the data, and parameter estimates are provided in Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2003a) .
The 
where the \hat" over a variable denotes the estimate, i.e.,
To estimate the cost of land retirement at each point, p lr i , i =1,. . . , 13225,
we follow the approach of Smith, who measured the opportunity cost of land retirement via the cropland cash rental rate. 4 The Iowa State University Extension Service provided county-level data on cropland cash rental rates for low-, average-, and high-quality land together with the percentages of total county cropland in these three categories (ISU Extension). Under the assumption that the cropland cash rental rate is a monotonic function of corn yield potential, we estimated piece-wise linear functions that relate the yield potential to the cash rental rate and used the functions to estimate the cash rental rate of every NRI point in the study. The functions were estimated separately for each of the 99 Iowa counties to account for possible rent di erences that may exist due to land uses alternative to agriculture. The details of the rental rate function estimation are provided in the Appendix.
Empirical model of environmental bene ts
The environmental bene ts, carbon sequestered and soil erosion reduction are estimated at each of the NRI data points using the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model version 3060 (Izaurralde et al.). 5 EPIC has been extensively tested and validated for predicting environmental bene-4 Babcock et al. (1996 Babcock et al. ( , 1997 used the observed CRP rental rate in their analysis of contract renewals. This approach is not suitable for our purposes since the observed CRP rental rate data would not be representative of costs for land not currently enrolled. Since generally the CRP land is of lower quality than the land not in the program, this truncation would likely result in underestimating the average opportunity cost of land retirement.
An alternative approach was employed by Khanna et al., who directly estimated the net returns to keeping land in production. Our information is not detailed enough to follow this approach. 5 Earlier versions of EPIC were called Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (Williams) .
ts under a wide range of conditions, including data collected in Iowa (King, Richardson, and Williams; Chung et al. 1999 Chung et al. , 2002 . The simulations are carried out at a eld-scale level for areas homogeneous in weather, soil, landscape, crop rotation, and management system parameters. EPIC operates on a continuous basis using a daily time step. At each of the data points, three 30-year simulations were run: the rst assuming conventional tillage, the second assuming conservation tillage, and the third assuming LR with a grass cover. The NRI database provides baseline soil, landscape, crop rotation, and other input data for the simulations.
Conservation tillage is de ned as any tillage system that leaves at least 30 percent of the surface covered with crop residue and thus can be implemented in a variety of ways. Since the speci c information on tillage and other farming practices is not provided in the NRI database, we use the information provided by a statistically designed survey of farms in the area, the Cropping Practices Survey (USDA). For every surveyed farm, we constructed detailed records of tillage and fertilizer practices, speci cally noting the number and timing of tillage operations and tillage implements used and the number, timing, and mode of fertilizer applications together with the quantities of the nutrients applied. These records formed a representation of the distribution of farming practices in the study area, separated by the two tillage categories, conventional and conservation. For every NRI point, we randomly assigned a practice from the distributions depending on whether the point is assumed to be in conventional or conservation tillage. In this setting, modeling a switch of the farm from conventional to conservation tillage results in a replacement of the earlier assigned practice with the one 20 randomly drawn from the other distribution.
Environmental bene t accounting and payment
The estimated environmental bene t of a conservation program varies with the choice of baseline. Two possible baselines are potentially interesting:
one that counts bene ts in excess of conventional agricultural practices on all lands, and one that counts the bene ts only relative to the actual practice in place before a program is implemented. Two accounting schemes are studied to re ect these two baselines. In the rst, the environmental bene ts are measured against the environmental condition that would occur under conventional tillage. That is, the bene ts, which we refer to as total benets, are computed as the di erences between the appropriate EPIC outputs under LR (or conservation tillage) and conventional tillage (regardless of whether the parcel was already under conservation tillage).
In the second accounting method, bene ts are measured against the current state of the world which includes some adoption of conservation practices. In other words, the bene ts, which we refer to as new bene ts, are computed as the di erences between the appropriate EPIC outputs under LR (or conservation tillage) and the 1997 tillage predicted from the tillage adoption model in the absence of any subsidies.
A second feature of a conservation program that will a ect its cost e ectiveness is whether current adopters are eligible for payment or whether only those induced to adopt by the presence of the program receive payment. In our study, we present results on two combinations of bene t accounting and payments: (1) the \new bene t" scheme under which only new bene ts and new adopters are eligible for payments; and (2) the \total bene t" scheme under which total bene ts and all adopters are eligible for payments. 6 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the simulation data.
Results
We begin with the \new bene t" scheme as we consider this the most interesting and relevant in terms of social e ciency. As discussed later, the results of the \total bene t" scheme are qualitatively quite similar. When both programs are available, the marginal cost curve follows the WL supply curve at the lower levels of carbon bene ts, which is the consequence of the WL being the less expensive option at these bene t levels.
However, at the higher levels of bene ts, between 2.7 million and 4.5 million metric tons (MT) of new carbon, the combined policy marginal cost curve is lower than the two single-practice marginal cost curves. At the bene t levels The e ects of a pre-xed budget split on the amounts of new carbon bene ts obtainable are investigated at the funding level of $100 million a year, which constitutes about a 50 percent increase from the current conservation program funding received in Iowa. As can be seen from Table 2 , the optimal allocation of this funding between WL and LR programs would mean 99.6 percent of the budget spent for the WL program. However, if the WL budget share is xed at approximately 10 percent, which is the current national percentage of working land conservation programs in the USDA conservation programs, (Claassen, 2003) , the amount of carbon obtainable is much lower, around 1.9 vs. 2.8 million MT/year under the combined program.
Interestingly, this amount depends very little on whether the simultaneous or sequential program implementation is followed. As the WL budget share increases to the 50 percent projected nationally by 2007 (Claassen, 2003) , the amount of carbon obtainable increases to 2.5 million MT/year. Figure   8 depicts the carbon bene ts obtainable with the pre-xed budget split as the proportions of the maximum carbon obtainable under the combined policy with no pre-xed budget split for various WL budget shares. 7 As the WL budget share increases towards the optimal share of 99.6 percent, the proportion increases towards one.
With the \total carbon" scheme, the location of the three marginal cost curves relative to each other is qualitatively similar to the \new carbon"
scheme. Figure 9 provides the curves for the total carbon bene ts, i.e. measured relative to the case of conventional tillage. We assume that policymakers are paying a minimum of $10/acre for new and current adoption of conservation tillage. The two schemes also show similar qualitative results in Figure 8 .
When erosion is used as an environmental indicator, we obtain results similar to those for carbon sequestration. Thus, we present just an example. Figure 10 provides the marginal cost curves for the total erosion bene ts under the same minimum payment arrangement as that for carbon sequestration in Figure 9 . This similarity of the two environmental indicators is probably due to the positive correlation of the two indicators. Without this positive correlation, the results may di er.
Conclusions and additional discussion
In this paper, we develop a formal framework for assessing the tradeo s between two conservation programs that compete for the same parcels of land: the complete retirement of land from production (as done for almost 20 years in the CRP) versus a change in farming practices on working land (as proposed in the latest farm bill). We study the e ciency properties of alternative approaches to implementing these two competing policies including a combined policy with no pre-xed budget allocation, and two pre-xed budget allocation scenarios where parcels are chosen into the conservation programs either sequentially or simultaneously.
We empirically apply the theoretical framework for the case of conservation tillage on working land relative to land retirement when the environmental bene t of concern is carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. We found that WL is more cost-e ective relative to conservation through LR in our study area over most of the range of the potential carbon sequestration levels. Only at very high levels of carbon sequestration would it be cost effective to have enrolled land into an LR program instead of a WL program.
Of particular note in our empirical results is the magnitude of the e ciency losses due to the pre-xing of conservation budgets, regardless of whether a simultaneous or sequential implementation strategy is followed.
It is important to recognize that the qualitative empirical results found here may not hold for other regions of the country, as the cost of retiring agricultural land in Iowa is one of the highest in the nation (USDA-FSA) and the carbon sequestration potential of land retirement may be higher in 25 other parts of the country (Paustian et al.) . Further, conclusions regarding the superior cost-e ectiveness of WL may easily be reversed for other environmental bene ts, although for soil erosion in this study region there were no signi cant qualitative di erences in the conclusions.
Numerous aspects of the work undertaken here deserve additional consideration. Extension of the analysis to multiple environmental bene ts would be valuable, as would the extension to multiple conservation programs with pre-xed budget allocations. 
